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ABSTRACT
Cybercrime markets support the development and diffusion of new
attack technologies, vulnerability exploits, and malware. Whereas
the revenue streams of cyber attackers have been studied multi-
ple times in the literature, no quantitative account currently exists
on the economics of attack acquisition and deployment. Yet, this
understanding is critical to characterize the production of (traded)
exploits, the economy that drives it, and its effects on the overall
attack scenario. In this paper we provide an empirical investiga-
tion of the economics of vulnerability exploitation, and the effects
of market factors on likelihood of exploit. Our data is collected
first-handedly from a prominent Russian cybercrime market where
the trading of the most active attack tools reported by the security
industry happens. Our findings reveal that exploits in the under-
ground are priced similarly or above vulnerabilities in legitimate
bug-hunting programs, and that the refresh cycle of exploits is
slower than currently often assumed. On the other hand, cyber-
criminals are becoming faster at introducing selected vulnerabili-
ties, and the market is in clear expansion both in terms of players,
traded exploits, and exploit pricing. We then evaluate the effects
of these market variables on likelihood of attack realization, and
find strong evidence of the correlation between market activity
and exploit deployment. We discuss implications on vulnerability
metrics, economics, and exploit measurement.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion of the cyber-threat scenario reported in the
recent literature is fostered by the presence of an ‘underground’
economy that supports the development, deployment, and moneti-
zation of cyber-attacks [35, 36]. A few studies analyze the dynamics
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a
fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
CCS ’17, October 30-November 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA
© 2017 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-4946-8/17/10. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133960
of the underground and the markets that drive it [8, 36, 37], focus-
ing on either the economic mechanisms that enable the market
activity [8, 37], or the ‘after the fact’ analysis of its effects in the
real world [15, 36]. However, it remains impossible to fully char-
acterize the underground production of cyber-attacks without a
quantitative account of its economic aspects. For example, several
allegations currently exist on the costs of an exploit in the under-
ground markets. Similarly, the ‘economy of malware’ is thought
to have significant repercussions on the realization of real-world
attacks, yet no scientific account of this relation is currently present
in the literature. Likewise, legitimate vulnerability markets [63, 77]
have been designed to ‘compete’ with cybercrime markets, but the
two systems remain hardly comparable without a more precise
account of their economic aspects. In this paper we fill this gap
by focusing on the economic aspects of exploit acquisition and
deployment, hence providing an additional piece in the otherwise
incomplete cybercrime puzzle.
Part of the reason why such analyses are scarce in the litera-
ture is the difficulty of identifying and studying ‘good’ or ‘influ-
ential’ underground markets. Criminal markets are known to be
fraught with economic problems that hinder fair trade, and conse-
quently market development [37, 69]. Moreover, markets trading
attack technologies tend to be strongly segregated [8, 68, 69, 75],
making their access and study more difficult to accomplish. For
example, common segregation mechanisms include the implemen-
tation of pull-in mechanisms, language barriers (especially Rus-
sian/Portugese/Chinese), and ingress monitoring [8]. On the other
hand, non-English speaking attackers reportedly generate a signifi-
cant fraction of attacks [43, 78]; this may be partly due to the still
loose international regulation of the cyber-space [44], as well as
economic and social aspects on welfare and higher education in
developing countries [25, 49, 50]. For example, Russian cybercrimi-
nals are known to produce malware that does not attack ex-Soviet
nations (ex-CIS), in an attempt to not catch the attention of the local
authorities. On the other hand, a significant fraction of the malware
detected at scale, as well as attack vectors such as exploit kits and
booter services [35, 42, 48] are suspected to have been engineered
by Russian attackers [43, 48, 70].
In this paper we characterize the economic aspects of vulnera-
bility exploits as traded in a prominent Russian cybercrime market
(RuMarket1) for user infections at scale (as opposed to targeted
or 0-day attacks), and of their effect on risk of exploit in the wild.
Through market infiltration we collect information on trade of
vulnerability exploits spanning from 2010 to 2017, and correlate
this data with Symantec data on exploits detected at scale. Our
contribution can be summarized as follows:
1We do not disclose the real name of the market to minimize threats to our anonymity.
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(1) The time between vulnerability disclosure and appearance
of exploit in RuMarket is shortening, showing that attackers
are becoming more reactive in delivering selected exploits.
At the same time, number of actors and of traded exploits
is increasing; exploit prices are inflating, and exploit-as-a-
service models appear to allow for drastic cuts in exploitation
costs. This is particularly relevant for the development of
economic models of the underground, and impacts attacker
and risk modeling.
(2) We find strong evidence of the relation between market ac-
tivity and likelihood of exploitation in the wild. We find that
exploits that spawn higher levels of discussion in RuMarket
are associated with higher odds of exploitation in the wild,
and that high market prices hinder exploit deployment at
scale. This provides a quantitative link between attacker eco-
nomics and attack realization, and can directly contribute in
the development of (more) realistic attacker models.
(3) Exploit prices in the underground markets are aligned with
or above those of analogous ‘legitimate’ markets for vulner-
abilities and vary between 150 and 8000 USD, whereas the
arrival of new exploits is significantly slower than otherwise
often assumed. This provides insights on the incentives to
participate in the underground economy, and on the dynam-
ics of exploit introduction.
Scope of work. The goal of this paper is to provide insights on
exploit economics by analyzing one prominent Russian cybercrime
market; this work does not aim at providing a full enumeration
of all exploits traded in the underground: other cybercrime mar-
kets may feature different sets of exploits and/or foster different
cybercriminal activities, as well as enforcing different market reg-
ulation mechanisms. Similarly, RuMarket does not focus on 0day
exploits, whose employment for attacks at scale is reportedly very
limited [18], and are outside of the scope of this work.
This paper proceeds as follows. The following section discusses
related work. Methodology, data collection, and analysis proce-
dure are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 reports our analysis, and
Section 5 discusses our results.
2 RELATEDWORK
The economics and development of underground markets have
perhaps been first tackled by Franklin et al. [33]. On the other hand,
Herley et al. [37] showed that cybercrime economics are distinc-
tively problematic in that the lack of effective rule enforcement
mechanisms may hinder fair trading, and as a consequence the
existence of the market itself. A few studies analyzed the evolution
of cybercrime markets [8, 23, 35, 53, 68, 75], and provided estimates
of malware development [22] and attack likelihood [11], but no
quantitative account of economic factors such as exploit pricing
and adoption are currently reported in the literature [22, 63]. In
this paper we provide the first empirical quantification of these
economic aspects by analyzing data collected first-handedly from a
prominent cybercrime market.
Recent work studied the services and monetization schemes of
cyber criminals, e.g. to launder money through acquisition of expen-
sive goods [36], or renting infected systems [35, 42]. The provision
of the technological means by which these attacks are perpetrated
remain however relatively unexplored [63], with the exception of a
few technical insights from industrial reports [43, 70]. Similarly, a
few studies estimated the economic effects of cybercrime activities
on the real-world economy, for example by analyzing the mone-
tization of stolen credit cards and banking information [15], the
realization of profits from spam campaigns [45], the registration
of fake online accounts [71], and the provision of booter services
for distributed denial of service attacks [47]. However, a characteri-
zation of the costs of the technology (as opposed to the earnings
it generates), and the relation of trade factors on the realization of
an attack is still missing. This work provides a first insight on the
value of vulnerability exploits in the underground markets, and the
effects of market factors on presence of attacks in the wild.
The presence of a cybcercrime economy that absorbs vulnera-
bilities and generates attacks motivated the security community
to study the devision of ‘legitimate’ vulnerability markets that at-
tract security researchers away from the illegal marketplaces [77].
Whereas several market mechanisms have been proposed [46, 57],
their effectiveness in deterring attacks is not clear [46, 52, 61]. The
so-called responsible vulnerability disclosure is incentivized by the
presence of multiple bug-hunting programs by several providers
such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft, or ‘umbrella’ organiza-
tions that coordinate vulnerability reporting and disclosure [30,
63, 77]. It is however unclear how do these compare against the
cybercrime economy, as several key parameters such as exploit
pricing in the underground are currently unknown. Further, it re-
mains uncertain whether the adoption of vulnerability disclosure
mechanisms has a clear effect on risk of attack in the wild [61]. This
study fills this gap by providing an empirical analysis of exploit
pricing in the underground, and evaluating the effect of cybercrime
market factors on the actual realization of attacks in the wild.
3 METHODOLOGY
Sections 3.1 to 3.3 present our methodology and provide a detailed
description of our data. In Sec. 3.4 we outline the analysis procedure,
assumptions, and data handling. Sec. 3.5 discusses observational
biases of this study, and Sec. 3.6 addresses ethical aspects.
3.1 Market infiltration and evaluation
RuMarket is a forum-based market that can be reached from the
open Internet. Access to the market requires explicit admission
by the market administrators, who validate the access request by
performing background checks on the requester. The main criterion
for admission is the ability to demonstrate that the requester has
control over other identities in affiliated Russian hacking forums,
and that he/she has been active in the community.2 Gaining access
to RuMarket required approximately six months to build a cred-
ible profile, identify affiliated markets, and letting our alter-ego
gain reputation within the hacking community. These activities
required some level of proficiency in Russian. Section 3.6 provides
a discussion on ethical aspects. As members of the market, we have
access to all the (history of) product information, trades, and prices
2Admission criteria were initially enforced upon the 2013 arrest, performed by the
Russian authorities, of a prominent market member. The enforcement of the admission
criteria, albeit still present at the time of writing, has now loosened up.
available to active participants. This analysis spans seven years of
market activity (July 2010 - April 2017).
Criteria for market evaluation. It is important to first evaluate
whether the selected market is a credible candidate for analysis,
or is yet another example of many ‘scam-for-scammers’ under-
ground forums [33, 37]. Following indications in the literature on
the poor implementation of cybercrime markets [37, 75], in previ-
ous work [8] we performed an analysis of the markets’ economic
mechanisms (e.g. addressing information asymmetry [6], adverse
selection, and moral hazard [28, 37]), traded goods, and partici-
pation. We here provide a summary of the considered criteria. A
complete account of these aspects is given in [8].
Cr.1 Enforcement of market regulation mechanisms; market mech-
anisms enforcing market rules, such as punishment for rippers or
presence of trade guarantors or escrows are known to be central
to address foundational problems that cripple the economics of cy-
bercrime markets [6, 28, 32, 37, 75] and hinder product quality. We
found that in RuMarket, rippers are systematically punished, most
sellers use the market escrow services to guarantee transactions,
and that the high costs of market entry hinder unfair behavior.
Cr.2 Evidence of trade. We evaluated face evidence of actual trad-
ing activity in the market. Accounting for indications from eco-
nomic literature [62, 67], we investigate trade-related feedback from
market participants, discussions in the market threads, product evo-
lution, and type of market interactions; all evidence points toward
effective trade mechanisms that foster trading activity.
Cr.3 Presence of prominent attack tools reported by the industry.
The relevance of RuMarket in the threat scenario is supported by
the presence of traders for the most prominent attacks reported by
the industry. Among those, we find several exploit kits [35] (e.g.
Blackhole, RIG, Eleonore [3, 70]) and malware that led numerous
infection campaigns (e.g. Zeus, Citadel [17, 19, 60]).
3.2 Sampling exploits in the underground
The unstructured nature of forum-based markets calls for a few
additional considerations on data sampling: whereas most (crimi-
nal) goods such as drugs, weapons, and illegal pornography can be
easily identified and described or demoed by vendors (and there-
fore measured by investigators [69]), the disclosure of too much
information on an exploit would destroy its value [52], whereas
revealing too little eventually leads to market death (as buyers can-
not assess what they buy) [37]. In order to meaningfully sample
data points, it is therefore critical to identify the exploit reporting
criteria adopted by vendors.
To this aim, we randomly sample 50 posts from RuMarket gener-
ally referring to “эксплоит” (‘exploit’) and (slang) variants thereof,
and evaluate the type of reporting and received market response
(i.e. number of replies, and trade evidence [69]). In our sample we
find 19 ads selling 35 exploits overall. Four reporting mechanisms
emerge: using the standard Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) identifier [2]; describing an exploit as affecting a disclosed
vulnerability (Knwn); describing it as a 0day; not describing it at all
(Und.). Table 1 summarizes the results. Overall, we find nine adverts
reporting 30 CVEs, one reporting a single 0day, and four reporting
one Knwn vulnerability each. Five additional posts (Und.) advert an
Table 1: Exploit identification and market activity
Vulns Replies Trade evidence
Type Ads Tot. Avg. Tot. Avg. Yes No %
CVE 9 30 3.3 518 57.5 5 4 55%
Knwn 4 4 1 55 13.8 2 2 50%
0day 1 1 1 44 44 0 1 0%
Und. 5 - - 65 13 1 4 25%
undefined number of vulnerabilities without further details on af-
fected software or type of exploit. The first observation is that posts
reporting CVEs trade on average significantly more vulnerabilities
than other posts (p = 0.03 for a Wilcoxon rank sum test), indicating
that this category likely represents the great majority of marketed
exploits. Adverts reporting CVEs also show greater market activ-
ity, measured in terms of received replies (p = 0.05), than other
posts. Similarly, poorly described vulnerabilities are unlikely to
show any evidence of trade, whereas CVE and Knwn vulnerabilities
display similar rates. Overall, we find that vulnerabilities reported
by CVE represent the significant majority of traded vulnerabilities
(by almost an order of magnitude), and receive significantly more
attention from the RuMarket community than the aggregate.
Further supporting the relevance of CVE reporting, we find that
market participants actively look for CVE information when not
immediately available; for example, an interested buyer of the KTR
package asks (translated from Russian): “Which exploits are bundled
in the pack at the moment? If possible, specify the CVE”; the seller
complies. Numerous other examples go in this same direction. Crit-
ically, this mechanism allows buyers to perform a first assessment
of the exploit, and to verify that the characteristics of the vulnera-
bility it exploits match the vendor’s claims (e.g. allow for remote
code execution or privilege escalation); this, alongside other market
mechanisms described in previous work [8], directly addresses the
problem of adverse selection, foundational to all markets of this
type, and first underlined in [37]. Indeed, vulnerability identifica-
tion is part of the regulation of the market itself: for example, a
vendor was blocked by the forum administrators when trying to
sell (for 3000 USD) an identifiable Windows PoC (CVE-2012-0002);
the admin explains: “This [exploit] is public (if not today, tomorrow).
The DOS proof-of-concept is already public. Such sales are prohibited”.
For these reasons in this study we use CVE-IDs as a sampling
mechanism for traded exploits. This has also the advantage of al-
lowing us to precisely measure additional characteristics of the
vulnerability, including date of disclosure, technical severity, af-
fected software, and presence in the wild, all of which would be
impossible without a rigorous definition of published exploits. Im-
portantly, this also rules out errors caused by double counting
vulnerabilities, while accounting for the vast majority of published
exploits (ref. Tab 1). The remaining bias is discussed in Sec. 3.5.
3.3 Data collection
In this analysis we employ three datasets. The collected data fields
are reported in Table 2; in the Appendix we report an extended
description of each field.
Table 2: Summary of collected variables used in the analysis
Description and summary statistics of the collected data fields. Unit indicates the type of data field. Lvls indicates, for categorical variables, the number of factor levels.
Descriptive statistics are provided for cardinal/ordinal variables, and categorical variables with only two factors (encoded as 1: presence of condition; 0: absence of condition).
From the product descriptions naturally emerge the following package categorization (vulnerability descriptions from NVD [2]):
a) STANDALONE: packages traded as stand-alone exploits that are then personalized by the buyer. For example, CVE-2016-0189 “allow[s] remote attackers to execute arbitrary
code [..] via a crafted web site”, and is traded in RuMarket as a STANDALONE exploit to which the customer can add his/her own ‘private’ (sic.) shellcode.
b) MALWARE: exploits embedded in malware packaging services. Exploits in these packages typically allow for privilege escalation. For example, CVE-2015-1701 “allows
local users to gain privileges via a crafted application”, and in RuMarket is bundled in a MALWARE dropper that, when executed on the target machine, escalates to higher
privileges and executes the custom code.
c) EKIT: exploit packages typically rented (as opposed to traded) as exploit kits, namely web servers that deliver exploits and custom payloads to victims that are redirected
to the kit [48]. The rental period in our sample goes from a week to a month. EKITs operation requires the execution of arbitrary code on the victim system to remotely
drop the malware. For example, CVE-2016-1019 “allows remote attackers to [..] execute arbitrary code”, and in RuMarket it is embedded in the notorious exploit kit RIG.
Variable Dataset Unit Description Lvls Min Mean Max sd
CVE RuMarket,
NVD, SYM
Cat. The unique identifier of the vulnerability. 57
CVEPub NVD Date Date of vuln disclosure in NVD. 2006-04-11 2012-12-06 2016-11-10 970.84
ExplVen RuMarket Cat. The identifier of the product vendor. 23
ExplVenReg RuMarket Date Date of vendor registration in the market. 2008-05-25 2012-10-31 2016-03-27 873.05
Pack RuMarket Cat. Bundle of exploits traded in the market. 38
PubDate RuMarket Date Date of exploit introduction in a package. 2010-07-29 2014-06-25 2017-01-19 640.02
PackType RuMarket Cat. Pack classification in one of the categories
STANDALONE; EKIT; MALWARE.
3
PackPrice RuMarket USD Acquisition cost of the package. 100 2417 8000 2408.28
PackActiv RuMarket Messages Number of responses to package advert. 0 43.85 300 69.29
PackDeath RuMarket Date Date of last reply for the package. 2010-12-24 2015-03-16 2017-03-27 642.63
ExplPrice RuMarket USD Price estimate of single exploit. 13.64 969.00 8000 1708.76
SwVen NVD Cat. Vendor of the vulnerable software. 3
Sw NVD Cat. Name of the affected software. 7
CVSS NVD Ord. Vulnerability severity measured by the Com-
mon Vulnerability Scoring System.
5 8.76 10 1.33
SYM SYM Cat. Presence of exploit at scale. 2 0 0.84 1 0.38
(1) RuMarket. We query RuMarket and analyze results by read-
ing discussion topics and extrapolating relevant informa-
tion. Unfortunately the nature of the data limits the ap-
plicability of fully-automated data extraction procedures
(e.g. product updates and multiple products per advert, see
also [58]). We therefore employ semi-automated pattern
matching and manual analysis to extract the information.
We identify traded CVEs by querying RuMarket for matches
to the case-insensitive regular expression cve(-id)?(?i)
in the Virus, attacks, and malware commercial section of
the forum. This procedure returned 194 discussion threads
and approximately 3000 posts to examine in April 2017. To
minimize the chances of reporting ‘fake’ exploit products,
we consider only vendors that have not been reported as
‘rippers’ or banned from the community. This leaves us with
a sample of 89 traded exploits over 57 unique vulnerabili-
ties embedded in 38 packages for STANDALONE, MALWARE and
ExploitKit products, and attacking Microsoft, Oracle,3
and Adobe software. This is quantitatively in line with pre-
vious studies on marketed exploits [3, 4, 9, 48].
(2) NVD. The National Vulnerability Database [2], is the NIST-
maintained vulnerability database reporting vulnerability
characteristics, affected software, and severity.
(3) SYM. Vulnerabilities for which Symantec’s threat explorer
and attack signature databases report an exploit in thewild [26].
3All vulnerabilities labeled as Oracle are relative to the Java platform. Some of those
were disclosed while Java was Sun’s.
Vulnerabilities outside of SYM may still be actively exploited,
but are unlikely to be exploited at scale [9, 26]. This allows
us to correlate technical and market characteristics of vul-
nerabilities to the actual (mass) realization of an observed
exploit in the wild.
We join the three datasets on the CVE-ID of the vulnerability.
3.4 Analysis procedure
3.4.1 Estimation of exploit prices. When a package contains
more than one exploit, the cost of a single exploit can only be
estimated. From the literature on exploit development and deploy-
ment [9, 24, 29, 30, 48, 76] two aspects of vulnerabilities emerge
as drivers of exploitation effort: 1) vulnerability type (e.g. mem-
ory corruption vs cross-site-scripting) [29, 48, 76]; 2) exploitation
complexity (e.g. to evade attack mitigation techniques) [20, 24, 29].
Vulnerability type.TheMITRE corporationmaintains a community-
developed standard (Common Weakness Enumeration, CWE in
short) for the enumeration of software weaknesses [2]. This has the
purpose of identifying the type of technical issue that generates the
vulnerability. Table 12 in the Appendix provides a detailed break-
down of vulnerability CWE types by exploit package in RuMarket.
We find that packages typically embed vulnerabilities of the same
type (e.g. either remote code execution vulnerabilities or privilege
escalation vulnerabilities), which suggests that significantly skewed
distributions of exploitation efforts by vulnerability type within a
package are unlikely.
Exploit complexity. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) [31] defines Access Complexity as a measure of whether
a reliable exploit can be ‘easily’ obtained or additional measures
or attacks are required to, for example, avoid attack mitigation
techniques (memory randomization, canaries, etc.), or address spe-
cific software/system architectures [29, 31]. CVSSv2 assesses attack
complexity in three categories: High, Medium, Low [65]. AC:High
conditions have been shown to represent a threshold for exploit
adoption [9], whereas Medium and Low vulnerabilities require
only limited exploitation efforts [65] and are commonly detected
in the wild [9, 20]. Acknowledging this, the newer version of CVSS
(v3) considers only High (existence of conditions outside of the
attacker’s control) or Low (absence of conditions) values [31]. Out
of 57 unique CVEs in our sample, we find 2 vulnerabilities character-
ized by a High CVSS attack complexity, whereas the remaining 55
include only limited or no exploitation complexities for the attacker.
A further breakdown of attack complexity by package (Table 11
in the Appendix) shows that most packages prevalently include
vulnerabilities with the same AC assessment. This once again sug-
gests that exploit development efforts are not significantly skewed
among vulnerabilities bundled in a package.
In light of these considerations, in this study we estimate unitary
cost of exploit by assuming a uniform distribution of costs among
exploits in a package.4
3.4.2 Bootstrapped analysis of exploit prices. In an effort to pro-
vide a more precise estimate of exploit costs, we employ a block
bootstrap analysis (N = 10000) of exploit prices. The bootstrap pro-
cedure randomly re-samples (N times), with replacement, exploit
packages (i.e. our ‘blocks’, or sampling units) from RuMarket, and
approximates the true unknown distribution of the population of
traded exploits (of which we observe a sample) [27]. This allows us
to infer the parameters of the true distribution and to build robust
confidence intervals of price estimates.
3.4.3 Regression analysis. The nature of the sample requires
a few additional precautions to be taken for a formal analysis. In
particular, our exploit observations depend not only on the exploit,
but also on the specific vendor who publishes the package where
the exploit is bundled in. For example, qualified vendors may pub-
lish more reliable exploits that are more likely to generate attacks
in the wild. Hence, the measure of an exploit implicitly depends
on the vendor who publishes it (i.e. our data has an hierarchical
structure [5]).5 This ‘mixed effect’ should be captured to assure an
unbiased quantitative analysis. We denote µa as the (univariate)
random effect for the vendor a such that the expected value of the
observation for the ith measurement is E(Yai |µa ) = µai , i.e. the
expected value for the ith observation is conditional on µa . The
general regression form of our analysis is derived from [5] and is:
f (µai ) = zai µa + βxai (1)
where f is the link function, zai µa quantifies the random effect
at the intercept, and βxai is the vector of fixed effects and respective
coefficients. Standard model diagnostics are run for all regressions.
4Sec. 4.2 gives a detailed account of how this relates to different software packages.
5ExplVen and Package are both meaningful levels in the hierarchy of our sample.
As it is the vendor of the exploit that publishes the exploits, fixes exploit cost, and
determines exploit quality, we here consider the vendor as the main source of variance.
We report model Log-likelihoods for model comparison. The cal-
culation of p-values and model power are not straightforward for
mixed effects models. We report pseudo − R2 and p − values as
approximations provided by the R packages lmerTest and MuMIn,
alongside the standard deviation of coefficient estimation.
3.5 Limitations
The adopted CVE sampling mechanism may exclude some poten-
tially relevant vulnerability that we cannot measure precisely. Re-
sults in Tab 1 indicate that this sampling bias is likely minimal. It
is however worth noting that this is, unfortunately, an inherent
limitation of all studies on this type of markets: without engaging
in the trading activity, it is impossible to reliably measure what lies
behind a market post. For example the excellent work in [69] con-
servatively estimates market size by assuming that user feedback
relates to separate, single trade lots, as it is not possible to mea-
sure multiple trades in a single transaction. Similarly, as we cannot
measure unidentified exploits, our analysis should be considered a
conservative estimate of traded exploits in RuMarket.
The data collection in SYM reports exploits deployed en-mass
against consumer (typically Windows) systems, and does not di-
rectly extend to targeted attacks and 0-day vulnerabilities.
3.6 Ethical aspects and data sharing
The market infiltration was performed while the author was as
the University of Trento, Italy. All data collection happened at the
Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands. No activity
involved the deception of market participants other than for our
‘identity’. We only engaged in discussion on non-hacking topics
not to facilitate illegal activities. We use the anonymous network
TOR to conceal our identities. To preserve our anonymity in the
market we do not disclose the real name of the community. The
collected data is available for sharing.6
4 DATA ANALYSIS
This analysis is structured in three parts. In the first (Sec. 4.1) we
describe the market by analyzing the activity of market participants
and the characteristics of the traded exploit packages. In the second
part (Sec. 4.2) we analyze market factors driving exploit prices, and
in the third (Sec. 4.3) the adoption of exploits in the wild.
4.1 Overview of RuMarket
4.1.1 Exploit vendors. It is first important to provide an overview
of the exploit vendors that participate in RuMarket activities. Our
RuMarket sample contains 22 uniquely identified vendors that trade
CVEs in MALWARE, STANDALONE, and EKIT packages. The market
mechanism generates strong disincentives for the creation of multi-
ple accounts [8]. Following the approach adopted for similar appli-
cations in related work [69], in the following we consider vendor
aliases as unique seller identifiers. Figure 1 shows the appearance
of vendors trading exploits in RuMarket. The solid line reports the
count of new vendors appearing in the market (i.e. vendors that did
not publish a CVE exploit in the preceding years in RuMarket un-
der the same alias); the dotted line reports the cumulative count of
6Access procedure available at http://security1.win.tue.nl.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0
5
10
15
20
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Co
un
t o
f n
ew
 a
u
th
or
s
New authors Cumulative
Figure 1: Count of vendors trading CVEs in RuMarket
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Figure 2: Distribution of packages and exploits by vendor
vendors. The number of vendors increases at a steady linear rate of
approximately three new vendors per year during the observation
period. This suggests that exploit trading in RuMarket is growing.
Figure 2 offers a breakdown of vendor activity by product type by
plotting the CDF of number of exploit packages introduced by each
vendor and the number of exploits they embed in their products.
EKIT vendors typically publish only one product, whereas MALWARE
and particularly STANDALONE vendors appear to trade significantly
more packages. This is interesting to observe as EKIT products
(and to a lesser degree MALWARE products [60]) are traded under the
‘exploit-as-a-service’ model, whereby the seller maintains a service
for a period of time during which customers rent the kit to deliver
their own attacks. The maintenance operations include delivering
vulnerable traffic to the customers, updating the exploit portfolio,
and packing existing exploits to minimize detection in the wild
(to generate the so-called FUD, ‘Fully UnDetectable’ exploits) [48].
The implied prolonged contractual form explains the prevalence of
vendors with only one exploit package in their portfolio for EKIT
and MALWARE vendors. On the other hand, EKIT vendors are by far
the more ‘productive’ in terms of number of exploited vulnerabili-
ties, with 50% of EKIT vendors contributing more than 10 exploits.
STANDALONE vendors typically focus on a few exploits only, trading
on average below three exploits, and only a small fraction of ven-
dors trades overall more than 5 exploits. MALWARE vendors are the
least productive in terms of exploited CVEs: whereas historically In-
ternet worms and malware such as Slammer or Conficker exploited
software vulnerabilities to replicate, in recent years infections hap-
pen mostly through Malware Distribution Networks [34, 35, 59]
that implement the target exploitation by other means (e.g. exploit
kits or ‘malvertising’), and allow for the malware to be ‘dropped’
on the attacked system, with only a few exceptions.
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Figure 3: Distribution of exploit vendor age
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Figure 4: Release of exploit packages by type per year
Foundational studies in economics [67] as well as more recent
research on online marketplaces [21] put the emphasis on the re-
lation between (expectation of) product quality and placement of
the vendor in the market. Due to the unreliability of user feedback
on online forums, criminal online markets often employ as a proxy
for trustworthiness criteria such as time-on-market or number of
messages/specialty [8, 39]. These are costlier for malicious ven-
dors to replicate than simply posting positive feedback on their
own products. We use as a proxy measure of seller presence in
the market the number of days the vendor have been registered
on RuMarket at the time of package publication, and calculate it
as ExplVenAge = PubDate − ExplVenReg. Figure 3 reports this
distribution by package type. Exploit vendor age varies consider-
ably by type of package. STANDALONE vendors are those with the
highest average time on market at time of product publication. 50%
of STANDALONE vendors have been registered on the market for at
least six months, whereas only the top 30% of EKIT and MALWARE
vendors are above this threshold. Overall, we find that only 18% of
vendors publish their first package on the day of registration. 55%
of vendors have been registered for at least a month, and 32% for at
least a year. This indicates that RuMarket mechanisms encourage
prolonged market activity, which may determine higher levels of
trust among market participants [39].
4.1.2 Exploit packages. Our RuMarket sample reports data on
38 unique exploit packages; the breakdown is as follows: six EKIT,
six MALWARE, and twenty-six STANDALONE packages. We consider
the addition of new exploits in a pack as an update to an existing
package. Figure 4 reports the number of updates to the exploit
package portfolio by year in the market. In general, we can ob-
serve that the number of released products steadily increases every
year. This trend appears to be mainly driven by STANDALONE packs,
whereas EKIT and MALWARE packages are essentially stable in time,
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Figure 5: Market activity by exploit package
with the latter being the lowest on average. This is in line with
the exploit authors’ activity described above, and suggests that
these packages may enjoy a longer activity in the market. To eval-
uate this, we consider the days and volume of active discussion
since publication in the market as a proxy measure of RuMarket’s
interest in the product. We compute days of active discussion as
DaysActive=PackDeath-PubDate, and report PackActivity for
volume of active discussion. Figure 5 plots the two distributions.
The left plot reports longevity of RuMarket activity around an
exploit package. Inspection of the market message board reveals
that the length of activity around a package is not artificially in-
flated by the package vendor by continuously adding comments to
the advert. As expected, we observe that longevity of discussion
around EKIT packages is significantly higher than for STANDALONE
and MALWARE packages (p = 0.015 and p < 0.01 respectively for a
Wilcoxon rank sum test). RuMarket discussion around EKIT pack-
ages remains active for more than 500 days (approximately a year
and a half) for 50% of packages, with the top 10% products remain-
ing active in the market board for more than 3 years. Differently,
50% of STANDALONE and MALWARE packages remain active for up
to approximately 220 days, and only less than 25% remain active
for more than 500 days. Overall, we find that the average pack-
age remains active for a year since time of publication. The right
plot in Figure 5 plots the distribution of replies by package type.
EKIT packages receive on average significantly more replies than
other pack types, which is in line with previous figures. Conversely,
RuMarket interest around STANDALONE and MALWARE packages is
significantly lower, with only a handful of packages receiving a
comparable volume of discussion as the average EKIT. The lower
interest of the RuMarket community may be driven by the higher
difficulty of use of STANDALONE and MALWARE products, that require
additional effort to deploy and deliver the attack compared to EKIT
products [35]. Further, different price-tags, investigated below, may
explain the overall market interest.
Exploit pack prices. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of ex-
ploit pack prices and number of bundled exploits by package type.
STANDALONE packages are traded at a mean price around 3000 USD
up to 8000 USD, and bundle in between 1 and 4 exploits. The small
standard deviation indicates that most STANDALONE packages bun-
dle 1 exploit only. MALWARE packages are traded at a price range
between 400 USD and 4000 USD, with most package prices set at
around the 1000-2000 USD mark. Similarly to STANDALONE pack-
ages, MALWARE bundles typically include only one exploit, and up
l
l
ll
l lll l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
EKIT MALWARE STANDALONE
2012 2014 2016 2012 2014 2016 2012 2014 2016
5
6
7
8
9
Year of package publication
Lo
g 
pr
ic
e 
of
 p
ac
ka
ge
Figure 6: Log package price by year by product type
to three exploits. Finally, the lower 50% of EKITs are priced (ac-
counting for an average rent of 2-3 weeks [41]) in the range 150-400
dollars, whereas the upper 50% are in the range 400-2000 USD. EKIT
packages embed significantly more exploits than other package
types. This is in line with previous findings in the literature [48]
and, following Grier et al. [35], this allows for a greater flexibility
in terms of the range of selectable targets [10]. We give an account
of the specific exploits in the next section.
Following [63], we further investigate possible outliers in our
data tomitigate pricing noise.We find that the only four STANDALONE
packages that received no trade reply from the RuMarket commu-
nity were also traded at below average prices (in between 100/300
dollars each in year 2016). Similarly, we find only one EKIT that,
despite embedding twelve exploits, is priced at 150 dollars, signifi-
cantly below the EKIT mean of 560 USD. Figure 6 plots the results
in terms of trend in price per product type by year with these
outliers removed. MALWARE and STANDALONE packages show an in-
creasing trend whereas EKIT product prices are steadily decreasing.
Regression coefficients for the linear model displayed in Figure 6
are significant at the 5% level for MALWARE (β = 0.43, p = 0.05) and
EKIT (β = −0.28,p = 0.02) but not significant for STANDALONE pack-
ages (β = 0.23, p = 0.14). We find that ‘consumer’ services such as
EKIT products are becoming more easily available to the users, a fig-
ure compatible with the increasing trend of ‘commodified’ attacks
delivered in the wild [7, 35, 42, 56], whereas the remaining more
‘specialized’ sector of the market seems to be inflating. We do not
find any significant association between number of exploits in the
package and package price. This lack of correlation may indicate
that the business model behind exploit trading, as well as other
contextual considerations on market status, presence of similar
exploit, and affected software should be considered in the analysis,
as previously suggested by several authors [10, 14, 16, 35, 63, 72].
We give an extended account of this in the next section.
4.2 Analysis of exploits
4.2.1 Exploit demographics. Embedded in the packages we find
89 exploits targeting 57 unique CVEs in Microsoft, Adobe, and
Oracle products. Table 4 reports the counts of exploited software
for each product type. Microsoft vulnerabilities alone make up
for more than half the exploits traded as STANDALONE products
(56%); unsurprisingly, vulnerabilities in Oracle and Adobe prod-
ucts, as well as Internet Explorer vulnerabilities, are prevalent in
EKIT bundles, as these products are by design exposed to Internet
requests [35, 48]. Exploits bundled in MALWARE are for Windows and
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of package prices and bundled exploits
Package price (USD) no. bundled exploits
Type n Min 0.025p Mean Median 0.975p Max sd Min 0.025p Mean Median 0.975p Max sd
EKIT 6 150 157.92 693.89 400 1875 2000 708.94 2 2.12 6.83 7 11 11 4.26
MALWARE 6 420 428.75 1735 1250 3875 4000 1456.38 1 1 1.5 1 2.88 3 0.84
STANDALONE 26 100 100 2972.69 3000 8000 8000 2629.39 1 1 1.5 1 4 4 0.86
All 38 100 100 2417.46 1500 8000 8000 2408.28 1 1 2.34 1 11 11 2.63
Table 4: Breakdown of traded vulnerabilities
SwVendor Software MALWARE STANDALONE EKIT Sum
Adobe 2 12 17 31
flash 0 8 10 18
acrobat 2 4 7 13
Microsoft 7 22 14 43
office 0 11 2 13
int. expl. 0 4 7 11
windows 7 6 5 18
silverlight 0 1 0 1
Oracle 0 5 10 15
java 0 5 10 15
Sum 9 39 41 89
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Figure 7: Occurrences of exploit publication by year
Adobe Acrobat. A Fisher Exact test rejects the null hypothesis of
count uniformity (p = 0.0012), suggesting that exploited software
varies by package type.
Figure 7 plots the occurrences of exploit publications by year
and by software vendor. We observe that during the first years of
RuMarket operation there is a spike in number of published ex-
ploits for all platforms. Oracle products result as the most affected
in that year, followed by Adobe and, closely, Microsoft products.
This observation matches the surge around 2010-2013 of ‘cyber-
crime as a service’, thoroughly reported in the scientific literature
and industry in that time-frame [35, 48, 70]. Interestingly, Oracle
exploits seem to plunge after 2013; this coincides with the intro-
duction in major web browsers of plugin-blocking features,7 and
a Java update (released in January 2013) that increases the default
security settings of the plugin8 (e.g. triggering certificate errors as
exploited by several exploit kits [48]). This also independently sup-
ports previous findings on exploitation of Java vulnerabilities [40].
7https://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/12/10/firefox_26_blocks_java/, last visit Aug 2017.
8http://bit.ly/2r8MLz1, last visit Aug 2017.
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Figure 8: Number of repackaged exploits by year
Following 2013, Microsoft and Adobe exploits are publised at sim-
ilar, steady rates. Anecdotally, we observe that the shape of the
described curve resembles the Gartner Hype Cycle9 curve, whereby
after a first spike at the beginning of a new product cycle (the
‘Peak of Inflated Expectations’) the market experiences a relative
drop (‘Trough of Disillusionment’) followed by a ‘plateau’ where the
technology reaches maturity (‘Plateau of Productivity’) [8].
4.2.2 Exploit arrival. Figure 8 reports the number of newly re-
leased (yellow) and repackaged (black) exploits in each package
type by year. The introduction of new exploits in RuMarket is pri-
marily driven by STANDALONE and EKIT packages, with MALWARE
packages mainly re-introducing already published exploits. In par-
ticular, STANDALONE products seem to propose new exploits at a
yearly rate of approximately 80% for each package. EKIT products
introduced a significant number of exploits in 2011 (their ‘debut’
year on the markets [35, 70]), whereas newer exploit kits appear to
embed a lower number of exploits. This confirms previous figures
whereby exploit kits are specializing to use fewer, more reliable
exploits than at their original introduction [48]. Table 13 in the Ap-
pendix reports the evolution of repackaged exploits by PackType.
Most exploits first appear in STANDALONE and EKIT packages and
re-appear in a pack of the same type, with a few exceptions. Among
these, STANDALONE exploits seem to reappear in both MALWARE and
EKIT packs, whereas EKIT exploits are prevalently re-packed in
other kits. STANDALONE exploits seem therefore to play a role in
the ‘innovation’ process in RuMarket; this may indicate the pres-
ence of an ‘exploit chain’ whereby the most reliable and effective
STANDALONE exploits are selected for future inclusion in EKIT prod-
ucts for deployment at scale.
It is interesting to evaluate the rate at which exploit introduction
happens. A few recent studies suggest that the rate of appearance
of new exploits may be much lower than previously thought [10,
9http://gtnr.it/1g1Nnw0, last visit Aug 2017.
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Figure 9: Distribution of days between exploit introduction
Table 5: Exploit age (days) at time of first publication
Type Min 0.025p Mean Med. 0.975p Max sd n
EKIT 1 4 372.48 294 1659.8 1745 470.16 25
MAL 185 185 185 185 185 185 - 1
STDL 1 8 147.34 75 549.7 934 189.66 29
All 1 2.75 250.36 93 1368.85 1745 359.97 55
18], but no account of exploit timing in the cybercrime markets
currently exists. Figure 9 shows a breakdown by software vendor of
the distribution of days between the introduction of new exploits
(left) and re-packed exploits (right). We exclude from the analysis
six EKIT vulnerabilities that have been added to the respective
packages as updates, but whose date of addition is not reported
in the market. This leaves us with 83 exploits, of which n = 55
are introduced for the first time in the market. New exploits are
introduced at similar rates for all software vendors, with 50% of
exploits being introduced at approximately six months intervals
(175 days). The ‘fastest’ 25% is introduced two months (62 days)
after the appearance of an exploit for the same software platform,
whereas the ‘slowest’ 25% appears after more than a year (401 days).
These figures are in sharp contrast with current assumptions made
in the literature, whereby essentially all ‘severe’ vulnerabilities
are potentially exploited at scale by attackers [54, 66] (and must
therefore be fixed immediately [73]). On the contrary, these findings
support recent evidence pointing in the opposite direction: most
vulnerabilities are not of ‘economic’ interest for an attacker, as
the addition of a new vulnerability may not lead to a significant
increase in targeted systems [12, 55]; this results in significantly
skewed distributions of risk per vulnerability (as empirically shown
in [7, 56], and analytically modeled in [12]). Exploit re-packaging
(right plot in Fig. 9) happens at significantly faster rates: 75% of
exploits are re-introduced within 184 days from first publication,
indicating that their commercial interest is short-lived.
A different question is how ‘old’ are exploits when they first ap-
pear on themarket.We compute exploit age as the difference in days
between exploit publication in the market and publication of the
corresponding CVE on the NVD, i.e. ExplAge = PubDate − CVEPub.
Table 5 reports the distribution of exploit age for newly introduced
exploits. The mean and median exploit age varies considerably
by product type. STANDALONE exploits are on average significantly
younger at time of publication than other exploits (p = 0.05 for a
Wilcox rank sum test). 50% of STANDALONE exploits are published in
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Figure 10: Exploit age vs time of publication in RuMarket
the market within 2.5 months (75 days) from the public disclosure
date. The top 25% (not reported in Tab. 5) are published within 40
days, and the top 2.5% within approximately a week. The difference
in exploit age for the EKIT and MALWARE categories is not statisti-
cally significant. Whereas some exploits do appear quickly after
disclosure in RuMarket, most exploits take around four months
from disclosure date to be published. This may indicate that other
factors such as effectiveness of older exploits [10], or delays in
user system updates [55, 64], may affect timing of appearance of a
marketed exploit. To evaluate the rate of change in time of arrival
of new exploits, Figure 10 reports the exploit age distribution by
year of publication. We observe that the mean exploit age decreases
steadily for more recent publication dates (β = −0.32, p = 0.001),
indicating that exploit vendors are becoming faster in releasing
exploits for newly disclosed vulnerabilities. The coefficient of the
linear regression indicates that exploits appear at an approximately
30% faster rate every year.
4.2.3 Estimate of exploit prices. Conceptually, the lower bound
cost of a pack can be summarized as follows:
PackPricep∈PT =
n∑
i=1
CExplpi +CDevp +CDeplp (2)
where CExplpi is the cost of the ith exploit in package p, and
CDevp and CDeplp are the development and deployment (includ-
ing maintenance) costs of the pack. For example, on top of the
sole exploits EKITs provide a web interface to control infections,
as well as additional deployment services such as remote servers
where the kit is hosted, or the redirection of vulnerable traffic to
the kit [35, 48]. Similarly, MALWARE packages provide additional
malware functionalities on top of the sole exploit. Hence, we have
CDevp > 0, CDeplp > 0,∀p ∈ Pt , with t ∈ {EKIT, MALWARE}. Un-
fortunately, an estimation of these costs would require an analysis
of the source code of these packages [22], which is not publicly
available. On the other hand, STANDALONE exploits are provided
as-is, i.e. only the vulnerability exploit is traded, without further
embellishments or services. This setsCDevp ≈ CDeplp ≈ 0 for this
category. This leaves us with only the term
∑n
i=1CExplpi which,
assuming a uniform distribution of exploit costs per package, (see
discussion in Sec. 3.4), yieldsCExplp∈PSTDL,i = 1/n ·PackPricep . We
therefore only report STANDALONE exploit estimates.10
Table 6 reports price estimates for exploits against different
10The estimation for all packages is reported in the Appendix, Table 14.
Table 6: (Bootstrapped) descriptive statistics of STANDALONE exploit price estimates in USD
STANDALONE exploit prices are estimated on a uniform distribution by package. To approximate the true (unknown) distribution of exploits,
we perform a bootstrap of our data (N = 10000), reported in parenthesis. The column n reports number of exploits for that software. The
bootstrapped data does not deviate substantially from our observations on the average. Fatter distribution tails indicate that RuMarket
outliers tend to bias sample statistics. Exploits are priced between 150 and 8000USD with significant differences by software.
SwVendor Software Min 0.025p Mean Median 0.975p Max sd n
Adobe 75 75 879.17 1250 1500 1500 693.54 12
(75) (100) (1000.06) (1040) (1500) (1500) (521.91)
flash 75 75 568.75 150 1500 1500 652.3 8
(75) (87.5) (562.05) (545.45) (1300) (1500) (316.52)
acrobat 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 0 4
(1500) (1500) (1500) (1500) (1500) (1500) (0)
Microsoft 150 150 2801.82 2250 8000 8000 2393.09 22
(150) (150) (2442.13) (2450) (5600) (8000) (1601.69)
office 150 362.5 3195.45 4000 7250 8000 2504.04 11
(150) (1605.1) (3407.31) (3262.5) (5750) (8000) (1112.54)
int. expl. 440 459.5 3035 1850 7625 8000 3504.22 4
(440) (440) (3051.89) (3000) (8000) (8000) (1727.18)
windows 700 800 2366.67 2250 4687.5 5000 1458.31 6
(700) (1100) (2349.27) (2327.27) (3750) (5000) (658.77)
silverlight 150 150 150 150 150 150 1
(150) (150) (150) (150) (150) (150) (0)
Oracle 25 25 1020 25 4502.5 5000 2224.89 5
(25) (25) (1847.02) (1020) (5000) (5000) (1981.08)
java 25 25 1020 25 4502.5 5000 2224.89 5
(25) (25) (1847.02) (1020) (5000) (5000) (1981.08)
software. In parenthesis we report the bootstrapped estimation of
exploit prices. We report mean, median, standard deviation and 95%
confidence intervals. Price estimates in the boostrapped sample ap-
pear to diverge at the tails of the distribution w.r.t the observed sam-
ple, suggesting that outliers in the sample may bias sample statistics.
Looking at exploits by software, we find that the most expensive
exploits in RuMarket are for Microsoft software, and are priced at
2500USD on the average. Among software from this vendor, Office
and Windows exploits appear to be the most expensive with 50% of
exploits above 2000 USD, and the top 2.5% quoted at about 7000 and
5000 USD respectively. As vulnerability patching and mitigation
hinder the effectiveness of an exploit in the wild [55], we further
evaluate whether exploit age affects exploit price estimates. We
find a negative correlation between ExplAge and ExplPrice (al-
beit not significant when looking only at the exploit), suggesting
that exploits lose value as they age (cor = −0.16, p = 0.3). We do
not find evidence of dependence between exploit price and CVSS
vulnerability severity.
4.2.4 Regression analysis of exploit price estimates. To evaluate
the factors driving exploit price, we employ a set of mixed effect
linear regression models over the response variable log(ExplPrice).
We report regression results for the following three nested models:
M1: log(ExplPricei ) = β0 + β1 log(ExplAдei ) + ϵi
M2: log(ExplPricei ) = · · · + β2SwVeni + ϵi
M3: log(ExplPricei ) = · · · + β3SwVeni × log(ExplAдei ) + ϵi
Table 7 reports the regression results. Coefficient estimates are con-
sistent among models. A Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) analysis
does not indicate any significant collinearity between the model
Table 7: Regression on STANDALONE exploit pricing
Variables: ExplPr ice = price estimate of exploit; ExplAдe = age of exploit
when advertised; SwV en = software vendor. Exploit age is negatively corre-
lated with price. Depreciation rate depends on the software vendor.
log(ExplPr ice) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
c 8.080∗∗∗ 5.592∗∗∗ 10.943∗∗∗
(0.746) (1.458) (1.735)
log(ExplAдe) -0.330∗ -0.268∗ -1.357∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.135) (0.234)
Adobe 1.993 -4.846∗
(1.395) (2.068)
Microsoft 2.662† -3.483†
(1.375) (1.891)
log(ExplAдe)× AD 1.398∗∗∗
(0.322)
log(ExplAдe)× MS 1.276∗∗∗
(0.272)
Var (c |ExplV en) 2.209 1.520 1.598
Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.28 0.38
Log-likelihood -64.2 -60.6 -51.8
N 39 39 39
(†) p < 0.1; (∗) p < 0.05; (∗∗) p < 0.01; (∗ ∗ ∗) p < 0.001;
predictors. Log-log relationships can be interpreted as the elasticity
between dependent and independent variables. For example, in
M3 the coefficient for log(ExplAдe) (−1.357) indicates that for a 1%
increase in the variable ExplAдe we can expect an average 1.4%
decrease (1.01−1.357 = 0.986) in ExplPrice . A rough quantitative
approximation of the effect can generally be obtained by simply
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Figure 11: Vulnerabilities exploited in the wild versus (left)
package price; (right) replies received on the market.
looking at the regression coefficients (e.g. β3 = −1.357 indicates
a decrease of approximately 1.4%). oefficients in M3 can only be
interpreted simultaneously with the coefficients of the interaction
effect log(ExplAдe) × SwVen. We find that baseline prices for ex-
ploits vary widely by software vendor, and are negatively correlated
with the age of exploit; Adobe and Microsoft exploits retain their
value significantly longer than Oracle exploits. This may indicate
a prolonged economic interest in the exploitation of Microsoft
and Adobe vulnerabilities, a finding consistent with related work
on the persistence of vulnerabilities on end-user systems [55].
Exploit vendors are a significant source of variance in price of ex-
ploit. Pseudo-R2 values indicate that the models’ power is adequate
in explaining the observed effect. In particular, Model 3 explains
approximately 40% of the variance in exploit price estimates. Im-
portantly, all variables of the model can be easily assessed with the
sole knowledge of the vulnerability at any point in time.
4.3 Exploitation in the wild
In this section we evaluate the effects of the identified market vari-
ables on the exploitation in the wild of traded vulnerabilities. A
consideration first: certain exploits may evade detection for some
time, for example by means of frequent exploit repacking. On the
other hand, it is unlikely for an exploit to remain completely under-
cover for a long time, while in the meanwhile delivering hundreds
of thousands or millions of attacks [7, 56]. To lower uncertainty
around exploit detection, we restrict our analysis to exploits pub-
lished in RuMarket at least a year ahead of the SYM data collection
(i.e. before the 1st of April 2016). This coincides with the median
lifetime of an exploit package in RuMarket (see Fig. 5), and allows
SYM a full calendar year to report an exploit at scale. We consider
effects before that time to be unlikely to be caused by type II errors
(i.e. no inclusion in SYM despite high attack volumes). This leaves
us with n = 78 exploits.
Package price and market activity vs exploitation. As we are con-
sidering the effect of the acquisition and deployment of an exploit
by the attacker, we consider cost of package (as opposed to cost of
exploit) because this reflects the upfront price the attacker needs to
pay in order to deploy the attack. Figure 11 reports the distribution
of package prices (left) and replies on the market (right) against
exploitation in the wild. Overall, we find that exploits in SYM are
traded at a lower upfront price than exploits not included in SYM.
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the effect of market interest
Table 8: CVSS category vs SYM
CVSS Category
C NC Sum
Not exploited 4 8 12
Exploited 53 13 66
Sum 57 21 78
(as estimated by PackActivity) on exploitation: exploits to which
the RuMarket community dedicated greater attention have a higher
chance of exploitation in the wild than exploits around which de-
veloped less market activity. A break down by package types does
not reveal any significant interaction between the variables. These
results also support recent findings underlying the importance
of the economics of the attack process in the analysis of cyber-
attack scenarios [14, 20, 56, 72], and in the development of sensible
cybercrime-based measures for risk of cyber-attack [13, 39].
Vulnerability severity. Previous studies revealed the lack of corre-
lation between technical vulnerability characteristics and exploita-
tion [20]. The consideration of additional factors, such as presence
of exploit in the black markets [9], is often advised by experts
and best practices to obtain more significant tests for actual ex-
ploitation [38]. Following [9], we categorize vulnerabilities in two
categories defined by the respective CVSS severity score: critical
(C) (CVSS ≥ 9) and non-critical (NC) vulnerabilities (CVSS < 9).
Table 8 reports the corresponding distributions against SYM. Sup-
porting previous research findings on Exploit Kits alone [9], we
find that critical vulnerabilities traded in the cybercrime markets
have a higher chance of exploitation in the wild (93% in our sample)
than non-critical vulnerabilities (62%, p = 0.0021).
4.3.1 Regression analysis of exploitation in the wild. To more
rigorously evaluate the correlation between the identified market
and vulnerability variables and exploitation in the wild, we select
three logit regression models of the following form over the binary
response variable SYM:
M1: SYMi = β0 + β1 log(PackActivityi ) + ϵi
M2: SYMi = · · · + β2 log(PackPricei ) + ϵi
M3: SYMi = · · · + β3 CVSS:NCi + ϵi
where SYM indicates presence or absence of exploit at scale; PackActivity
is the number of replies received by the product advert; PackPrice
is the upfront price to pay to obtain the exploit; and CVSS : NC is
the CVSS categorization of the vulnerability severity as non-critical.
Regression results are reported in Table 9.11 Coefficients should
be interpreted as the change in the odds ratio of exploit in the
wild. For example, Model 3 indicates that for every increase in one
unit of loд(PackActivity) there is a three-fold increase in odds of
exploitation in the wild (exp(1.101) = 3.01); the coefficient signif-
icance indicates that exploits bundled in packages around which
more market activity is developed are more likely to be detected in
the wild than exploits with less activity. Interestingly, we find that
package prices also have a significant and negative impact on odds
11An OLS robustness check run on average values of regressors for each CVE (reported
in the Appendix) yields equivalent results.
Table 9: Regression on odds of exploitation
Variables: PackActivity = replies received in the market; PackPr ice =
price of package;CV SSCat = CVSS category. Market, economic and vulner-
ability factors are correlated with odds of exploit at scale.
SYM Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
c 0.245 6.056† 6.754∗
(1.526) (3.302) (3.086)
log(PackActivity) 0.673† 0.938∗ 1.101∗
(0.383) (0.400) (0.451)
log(PackPr ice) -0.982∗ -1.013∗
(0.460) (0.444)
CVSS:NC -2.409∗∗
(0.830)
Var (c |ExplV endor ) 3.071 0.617 0.000
Pseudo − R2 0.11 0.51 0.65
Log-likelihood -28.4 -25.3 -20.4
N 78 78 78
(†) p < 0.1; (∗) p < 0.05; (∗∗) p < 0.01; (∗ ∗ ∗) p < 0.001;
of exploitation. This indicates that, everything else being equal,
exploits bundled in more expensive packages are less likely to be
detected in the wild than comparable exploits bundled in less ex-
pensive packages. These findings weigh favorably on the existence
of a relation between market activity and exploit deployment in the
wild [9, 15, 56]. Vulnerability severity has also a negative impact on
likelihood of exploit, indicating that risk of exploitation for vulnera-
bilities in RuMarket increases for critical vulnerabilities. All models
show satisfactory Pseudo-R2 values, with Model 3 explaining most
of the variance.
5 DISCUSSION
Exploit measures. An important aspect of threat assessment is
the consideration of exploit metrics. Current approaches often im-
plement these by looking at the technical requirements of an at-
tack, including the evasion of attack mitigation measures [74] and
complexity of the attack [20]. While a technical assessment of the
‘operational’ requirements of an attack can shed light on the rela-
tive ordering of attack preferences, it is hard to quantify absolute
likelihoods. For example, a utility-maximizing attacker may decide
to not perform (or delay) an attack because they do not believe
that there is a positive payoff, given cost of exploit acquisition. Our
analysis gives the first pointers in this direction by quantifying the
relation between time, software, and exploit pricing. Importantly,
this estimate only requires readily available information on the
vulnerability, and the elastic relationship between age of exploit
and price of exploit can be used to evaluate relative changes in
exploit price as time passes. This directly affects current estimates
of attack cost used in risk assessment practices [20, 38, 74]. Simi-
larly, the update of attackers’ exploit portfolios is an important step
driving the variance in risk of attacks [10, 18]. We find that new
exploits are introduced at rates in between two and six months, and
are approximately equal for all software. The process driving this
update remains however to uncover: follow up studies may look
at the factors driving appearance of exploit in the markets (e.g. by
considering pre-existent exploits or software updates [10, 55]).
The dynamics of the underground markets have often been
pointed at as an important block of overall risk of attacks, but
a clear link between the two is currently missing. Whereas the
problem of attack attribution remains open (i.e. we cannot establish
a causality link), this paper provides important indications on the
correlation between market operations and realization of attacks.
This weighs in favour of the importance of economic aspects of
vulnerability exploitation to well-informed security practices (e.g.
vulnerability assessment and prioritization [38, 73]). For example,
our analysis of market activity and odds of exploitation in the wild
reveals a significant and positive relationship between the two.
Similarly, exploits that are more expensive to acquire have lower
odds of exploitation than ‘cheaper’ exploits. This information is
often ignored in risk-assessment studies [38], and condensed met-
rics for vulnerability assessment are used instead [54, 73]. Whereas
existing vulnerability metrics are known to not correlate to attacks
in the wild [9, 20], we find that they do once the effect of market
inclusion is considered as well. Importantly, this provides a useful
tool for a first evaluation of risk of exploit without insights from
the cybercrime markets other than whether the vulnerability is
present [9]. A more precise estimation can then be obtained by
measuring market activity around the packages embedding the
exploit. These results can be factored in current best practices for
vulnerability risk management and exploit mitigation [31, 51, 74].
Vulnerability economics. Previous studies in the literature high-
lighted the operations of criminal markets for drugs, arms and
pornography [69], and for the monetization of stolen information
resulting from an attack [36]. However, little insight exists on the
markets that, as opposed to (re)selling the result of an attack, trade
the technology that enables the attack in the first place. A few esti-
mates exist [1], but are mostly based on 0-day price allegations, vary
widely, and their relevance for the overall risk of attack remains un-
clear [18, 63]. The scientific community long discussed on the idea
of building ‘legitimate vulnerability markets’ [14, 46, 57], and the re-
sult is the institution of a few legitimate exploit markets [63] and of
several ‘bug bounty’ initiatives that reward security researchers for
the disclosure of new vulnerabilities [30], and discourage the partic-
ipation in the underground economy. In this vein it is interesting to
observe that the prices of modern bug-bounty programs are in line
or below those we identify on RuMarket. For example, [30, Tab. 4
pp281] reports that the majority of vulnerability prizes awarded by
Google in their Chrome Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP) are
at or below 1000 USD, and that most external contributors to the
program (i.e. vulnerability researchers) earn between 500 and 1000
US dollars. The median price of an exploit in RuMarket, showed in
Table 6, is at approximately 2000 dollars, a higher but not distant fig-
ure from those indicated in [30]. It is however unclear whether the
resulting balance weighs in favour of the legitimate or underground
vulnerability markets: the dynamics balancing vulnerability finding
(a notoriously demanding process [52]) and exploitation trade have
not been fully investigated in the literature yet. For example, at
the above rates it does not seem unlikely that vendors who sell
their exploits multiple times to different buyers may still be better
off participating in the cybercrime economy than moving to the
‘legitimate’ vulnerability markets, as in the latter vulnerabilities can
realistically be traded only once (as the trade creates an association
between the ‘0-day’ vulnerability and identity of whom discovered
it). The results in this paper represent a first building block in the
evaluation and enhancement of current legitimate vulnerability
markets, to foster the responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities and
attract skillful researchers away from criminal markets.
Our exploit price estimates provide additional insights on the
effect of different criminal business models on exploit pricing and,
therefore, accessibility of attack. With reference to Tab. 14 in the
Appendix, and despite the upwards bias of the estimate (Eq. 2), EKIT
exploits are priced, per unit, significantly below exploits in other
package types. This effect is driven by the higher number of exploits
bundled in EKIT (ref. Table 3), and underlines how the different busi-
ness model employed by EKIT services may allow exploit vendors
to drastically reduce exploit development and deployment costs.
Lower prices may make these tools more accessible to ‘wanna-
be-criminals’, and therefore generate more attacks overall. This
suggests that the criminal business model may play a central role
in the diffusion of cyber-attacks, and calls for additional studies
characterizing this effect. Further, we find that the studied market
shows clear signs of expansion, with a growing number of vendors,
exploits, attack products, and generally inflating package prices.
This indicates that market activity is unlikely to stop in the near
future, and that attacker economics will likely play an increasingly
more relevant role in the cybersecurity scenario.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented the first quantitative account of exploit
pricing and market effects on exploitation in the wild. Our findings
quantify a strong correlation between market activities and likeli-
hood of exploit. We find that the analyzed market shows signs of
expansion, and that exploit-as-a-service models may allow for dras-
tic cuts in exploit development costs. Further, we find that exploit
prices are aligned with or above those of ‘legitimate’ vulnerability
markets, supporting work on the identification of incentives for
responsible vulnerability disclosure and attack economics.
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Table 11: CVSS Access Complexity by package
H L M Sum
ADB 0 1 1 2
ADB2 0 0 1 1
ADB3 0 1 1 2
BANN 0 1 1 2
BOT 0 1 0 1
DOC 0 0 1 1
DOCPPT 0 0 1 1
DROP 0 2 0 2
DROP2 0 2 1 3
ELEN 1 2 8 11
FFLA 0 0 2 2
FLASH 0 1 2 3
GLUE 0 0 1 1
GLUE2 0 0 1 1
IE11 0 0 1 1
IE311 0 0 1 1
IEG8 1 0 0 1
JAVA 0 3 1 4
JAVA2 0 1 0 1
KATR 1 5 5 11
LPE 0 1 0 1
MSW 0 0 1 1
MSW2 0 0 2 2
NEUT 0 2 0 2
OFF 0 0 1 1
PAC 0 0 1 1
PDF 0 1 1 2
PRIV 1 2 1 4
PRIV1 0 1 0 1
R0 0 2 0 2
RIG 0 5 5 10
SILV 0 0 1 1
VIS 0 1 0 1
WMI4 0 0 4 4
XP 0 0 1 1
ZOMB 0 0 3 3
Sum 4 35 50 89
APPENDIX
EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF DATA FIELDS
In the following we report a detailed list of the collected data fields.
CVE. The Common Vulnerability and Exposures ID assigned by
the MITRE corporation to disclosed software vulnerabilities.
CVEPub. The date of vulnerability publication on NVD.
ExplVen. The anonymized market identifier of the user who
posts the advert on the market.
ExplVenReg. The date of vendor registration on the forum.
Pack. The exploit package advertised by the seller on the market.
Packages bundle one or more vulnerability exploits.
PubDate. The date of package publication in RuMarket.
PackType. The type of exploit package. The categorization emerges
from the ExplVen package description.
PackPrice. The upfront price that the customer has to pay to
acquire or rent the package. For rental packages we compute the
mean rental price for a rental period of 3weeks, in linewith previous
work on the duration of malware delivery campaigns and user
infections [41]. All prices in RuMarket are reported in USD.
PackActivity. The RuMarket activity around an exploit pack-
age expressed as the number of replies received by the product
advert on the market.
PackDeath. The date when RuMarket activity around the pack-
age stops.
ExplPrice. Estimation of cost of a single exploit. When only
one exploit is bundled in a package, this corresponds to the package
price, otherwise we provide an estimation. Further considerations
are given in Sec. 3.4.
SwVen. The vendor of the vulnerable software affected by the
published exploit.
Sw. The vulnerable software or platform.
CVSS. The severity of the exploited vulnerability as expressed by
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System, the standard framework
for evaluation of software vulnerability characteristics [31].
SYM. Presence or absence of an exploit in the wild at scale.
SYM REGRESSION
Table 10 below reports standard OLS coefficients using the average
value of the fixed effects for each CVE as regressors. Results are
equivalent to those shown by the mixed model in Table 9.
Table 10: OLS regression of exploitation in the wild
SYM Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
c -2.062 5.652 6.846†
(1.479) (3.580) (3.959)
log(PackActivity) 1.108∗ 1.436∗∗ 1.593∗
(0.460) (0.549) (0.627)
log(PackPr ice) -1.184∗ -1.299∗
(0.546) (0.589)
CVSS:NC -2.184†
(1.124)
McFadden R-sq. 0.2 0.4 0.5
Log-likelihood -17.7 -14.1 -11.9
N 51 51 51
Table 12: CWE counts by package
CWEs are uniformly distributed among packages, i.e. each pack
contains vulnerabilities of the same or comparable type. This
indicates that within a single package, exploit development cost
are comparable and significantly skewed distributions of costs
are unlikely.
1. Buf. Err. (CWE-119)
2. Code Inj. (CWE-94)
3. Data Handl. (CWE-19)
4. Input Val. (CWE-20)
5. Ins. Inf, (NVD-CWE-noinfo)
6. Link Following (CWE-59)
7. NONE
8. Num. Err. (CWE-189)
9. OS Comm. Inj. (CWE-78)
10. (NVD-CWE-Other)
11. Path Trav. (CWE-22)
12. Perm., Priv., Acc. Cntrl (CWE-264)
13. Res. Mngmt Err (CWE-399)
14. Use Af. Free (CWE-416)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Sum
ADB 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
ADB2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
ADB3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
BANN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
BOT 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
DOC 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
DOCPPT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
DROP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
DROP2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
ELEN 2 2 0 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 11
FFLA 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
FLASH 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
GLUE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
GLUE2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
IE11 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
IE311 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
IEG8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
JAVA 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
JAVA2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
KATR 1 2 0 1 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 11
LPE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
MSW 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
MSW2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
NEUT 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
OFF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
PAC 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
PDF 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
PRIV 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
PRIV1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
R0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
RIG 2 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 10
SILV 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
VIS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
WMI4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
XP 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
ZOMB 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Sum 14 13 1 7 26 0 1 9 4 3 0 7 3 1 89
Table 13: History of re-packaged vulnerabilities
CVE no. Sw SwVendor Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
2015-8651 4 flash adobe STANDALONE STANDALONE STANDALONE EKIT
2010-0188 4 acrobat adobe EKIT EKIT MALWARE MALWARE
2012-1864 3 windows microsoft STANDALONE MALWARE MALWARE
2015-1701 3 windows microsoft STANDALONE MALWARE MALWARE
2010-4452 3 java oracle EKIT EKIT STANDALONE
2006-0003 3 int._expl. microsoft EKIT EKIT EKIT
2010-1885 3 windows microsoft EKIT EKIT EKIT
2016-1019 2 flash adobe STANDALONE EKIT
2013-2729 2 acrobat adobe STANDALONE STANDALONE
2013-0640 2 acrobat adobe STANDALONE STANDALONE
2015-2545 2 office microsoft STANDALONE STANDALONE
2015-0057 2 windows microsoft STANDALONE MALWARE
2013-3660 2 windows microsoft STANDALONE MALWARE
2011-0611 2 acrobat adobe EKIT EKIT
2010-0886 2 java oracle EKIT STANDALONE
2008-2463 2 office microsoft EKIT EKIT
2015-0336 2 flash adobe EKIT STANDALONE
2013-3918 2 int._expl. microsoft STANDALONE STANDALONE
2015-2419 2 int._expl. microsoft STANDALONE EKIT
2014-6332 2 windows microsoft EKIT STANDALONE
2010-0840 2 java oracle EKIT STANDALONE
2011-3544 2 java oracle STANDALONE EKIT
2012-0158 2 office microsoft STANDALONE STANDALONE
Table 14: (Bootstrapped) descriptive statistics of exploit price estimates in USD by software
We compute expected exploit prices by considering a uniform distribution of exploit costs by package. To approximate the true (unknown) distribution
of exploits per package and software, we perform a bootstrap of our data (N = 10000). Estimates for MALWARE and EKIT exploits are only indicative
as development costs of the package can not be accounted for. We report descriptive statistics of the original and of the bootstrapped sample means
in parenthesis. The column n reports number of exploits for that software in the respective package type. The bootstrapped data does not deviate
substantially from our observations on the average. Fatter distribution tails indicate that RuMarket outliers tend to bias sample statistics. Microsoft
exploits are on average the most valuable in the market irrespective of package. MS Windows and Office exploits are consistently the most expensive.
Adobe and Oracle are closely second and third. EKIT prices by exploit are substantially lower than for STANDALONE and MALWARE exploits.
Pack Type SwVendor Software Min 0.025p Mean Median 0.975p Max sd n
EKIT
Adobe 13.64 13.64 98.24 31.67 333.33 333.33 111.28 17
(13.64) (13.64) (135.79) (106.86) (333.33) (333.33) (90.38)
flash 31.67 31.67 91.86 31.67 299.24 333.33 105.33 10
(31.67) (31.67) (132.99) (98.7) (333.33) (333.33) (89.9)
acrobat 13.64 13.64 107.36 13.64 310.61 333.33 127.34 7
(13.64) (13.64) (138.59) (114.55) (333.33) (333.33) (90.77)
Microsoft 13.64 13.64 115.71 120.83 284.09 333.33 96.76 14
(13.64) (13.64) (113.81) (111.44) (232.32) (333.33) (62.23)
office 13.64 17.84 97.73 97.73 177.61 181.82 118.92 2
(13.64) (13.64) (98.44) (97.73) (181.82) (181.82) (63.88)
int. expl. 13.64 16.34 97.47 120.83 181.82 181.82 71.89 7
(13.64) (13.64) (94.92) (97.47) (181.82) (181.82) (38.63)
windows 13.64 15.44 148.45 181.82 318.18 333.33 130.6 5
(13.64) (13.64) (146.27) (148.45) (333.33) (333.33) (66.71)
Oracle 13.64 13.64 87.32 106.67 181.82 181.82 68.78 10
(13.64) (13.64) (94.75) (92.26) (181.82) (181.82) (39.1)
java 13.64 13.64 87.32 106.67 181.82 181.82 68.78 10
(13.64) (13.64) (94.75) (92.26) (181.82) (181.82) (39.1)
MALWARE
Adobe 420 421.75 455 455 488.25 490 49.5 2
(420) (420) (455.35) (455) (490) (490) (26.71)
acrobat 420 421.75 455 455 488.25 490 49.5 2
(420) (420) (455.35) (455) (490) (490) (26.71)
Microsoft 333.33 333.33 1357.14 1500 3625 4000 1303.23 7
(333.33) (333.33) (1518.3) (1375) (4000) (4000) (745.71)
windows 333.33 333.33 1357.14 1500 3625 4000 1303.23 7
(333.33) (333.33) (1518.3) (1375) (4000) (4000) (745.71)
STANDALONE
Adobe 75 75 879.17 1250 1500 1500 693.54 12
(75) (100) (1000.06) (1040) (1500) (1500) (521.91)
flash 75 75 568.75 150 1500 1500 652.3 8
(75) (87.5) (562.05) (545.45) (1300) (1500) (316.52)
acrobat 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 0 4
(1500) (1500) (1500) (1500) (1500) (1500) (0)
Microsoft 150 150 2801.82 2250 8000 8000 2393.09 22
(150) (150) (2442.13) (2450) (5600) (8000) (1601.69)
office 150 362.5 3195.45 4000 7250 8000 2504.04 11
(150) (1605.1) (3407.31) (3262.5) (5750) (8000) (1112.54)
int. expl. 440 459.5 3035 1850 7625 8000 3504.22 4
(440) (440) (3051.89) (3000) (8000) (8000) (1727.18)
windows 700 800 2366.67 2250 4687.5 5000 1458.31 6
(700) (1100) (2349.27) (2327.27) (3750) (5000) (658.77)
silverlight 150 150 150 150 150 150 1
(150) (150) (150) (150) (150) (150) (0)
Oracle 25 25 1020 25 4502.5 5000 2224.89 5
(25) (25) (1847.02) (1020) (5000) (5000) (1981.08)
java 25 25 1020 25 4502.5 5000 2224.89 5
(25) (25) (1847.02) (1020) (5000) (5000) (1981.08)
